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Our in-the-moment experience of the world can feel vivid and rich, even
when we cannot describe our experience due to limitations of attention,
memory or other cognitive processes. But the nature of visual awareness is
quite sparse, as suggested by the phenomena of failures of awareness,
such as change blindness and inattentional blindness. I will argue that
once failures of memory or failures of comparison are ruled out as expla-
nations for these phenomena, they present strong evidence against rich
awareness. To accommodate and explain these massive failures of aware-
ness, any theory of phenomenal consciousness must downgrade
phenomenology to a degree where it is functionless or, ironically, does not
reflect what we experience.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Perceptual consciousness and
cognitive access’.1. Introduction
We seem to experience a rich visual world. As we go through our day, we
encounter all types of colours, objects and events. This sense of experiencing
things right in front of our eyes has inspired—and continues to inspire—many
aspects of perception research. Vision scientists have a special affinity for phe-
nomenologically convincing demonstrations of visual phenomena. When a
new phenomenon ‘works as a demo’, it effectively and intuitively reveals an
aspect of how the mind works [1]. This functionality of phenomenology carries
a lot of weight when building mechanistic and theoretical accounts of perceptual
processing. In short, vision scientists take phenomenology seriously.
Even though we spend much of our life in a series of in-the-moment experi-
ences (when we are not remembering, planning or sleeping), it is surprisingly
difficult to assess the contents of what Block [2] has called phenomenal con-
sciousness: ‘what it’s like to be in [a] state’. (p. 227). Do we experience a rich
world that we simply cannot describe due to limitations of attention,
memory or other cognitive processes, as proposed by Block [2,3] and others
(e.g. [4–6])? Or is the nature of awareness quite sparse, as suggested by dem-
onstrations of failures of awareness, such as change blindness [7,8] and
inattentional blindness [9,10]? These questions are typically explored in the
domain of visual awareness, but they are relevant questions for other domains
of conscious experience as well. In the domain of olfaction, for example, there
does not seem to be a distinction between what we experience and what we
can access [11]. But in visual perception, whether awareness is rich and ‘over-
flows’ our ability to report about it or whether it is constrained by cognitive
limitations has been debated at length [12–15].
I will argue that to accommodate and explain inattentional blindness and
change blindness, theories of rich awareness downgrade phenomenology to
a degree where it is functionless or, ironically, does not reflect what we
experience. I will specifically argue that:
(1) distinguishing inattentional blindness and change blindness is important
because the two phenomena provide different evidence against rich
awareness;
visual display rich awareness
RSVP
iconic memory
change blindness
inattentional blindness
aware of every item, but
fail to compare
aware of colour diversity
but not individual items
aware of current item, but it
is not encoded into memory 
aware of every item, but fail
to encode into memory
post-cue brings items
into awareness
aware of unexpected event,
but fail to report unaware of unexpected event
sparse awareness
aware of current item, but it
is not encoded into memory 
Figure 1. Overview of experimental paradigms. The leftmost column represents the visual displays that are presented to participants. The middle column represents
what a participant would see and respond if they had rich visual awareness of the display. The rightmost column represents what a participant would see and
respond if they had sparse awareness of the display.
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many different paradigms, and such memory failures
are a reasonable alternative explanation for inattentional
blindness;
(3) one can rule out memory failures by instructing people
to immediately report what they see when they look at
a visual display;
(4) immediate report instruction in repeated inattentional
blindness experiments demonstrates that inattentional
blindness is a perceptual deficit;
(5) to accommodate and explain repeated inattentional
blindness and massive change blindness, theories of
rich awareness downgrade phenomenology.
2. Distinguishing change blindness and
inattentional blindness
The claim that in-the-moment experiences have rich phenom-
enology is challenged by two types of evidence: change
blindness and inattentional blindness. Although often dis-
cussed together, these two types of ‘blindness’ need to be
distinguished.
Change blindness is the failure to notice changes to a
visual scene, even if those changes happen right before
one’s eyes (e.g. [8]; see figure 1 for an example from [16]).
Change blindness has been demonstrated in dozens of differ-
ent ways. Many examples of change blindness include avisual interruption: from the simplest demonstrations, in
which an image will flash on and off with some detail chan-
ging between the two images (e.g. [17]), to more complex
demonstrations, such as short movies that use careful
camera work or editing to obscure a mid-scene change [18],
or real-life demonstrations where an experimenter swaps
places with another experimenter when a large object (e.g.
a plywood board or door) temporarily blocks the subject’s
view [19]. The failure of participants to notice these changes
is all the more surprising because built into many of the dem-
onstrations (especially those with images that flash on and
off ) is the task instruction to pay attention to and detect
changes to the scene (e.g. [17]). Therefore, in many cases of
change blindness, the inability to report the change is not
limited by a general lack of attention.
Do these failures to notice changes mean that awareness is
not in fact as rich and detailed as people seem to experience?
Not necessarily. First, many of the changes people fail to
report are small and irrelevant to the meaning of the scene.
Failing to notice some tree branches disappearing or the
colour of a person’s shirt changing generally has no conse-
quences for further cognitive processing. Thus, missing
small and irrelevant details is not convincing evidence
against rich awareness. Second, a failure to report a change
could be caused not by a failure to represent the scene
richly enough, but a failure to compare the representations
before and after the change1 [21]. Third, a failure to report
a change could be caused by a failure to encode the
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the before/after comparison, they would not be able to
report the change if the perceptual representations did not
make it into a durable form of memory in the first place.
For these reasons, failing to report a change in a change blind-
ness demonstration does not necessarily indicate a lack of rich
phenomenal experience.
Inattentional blindness paradigms overcome some of the
limitations of change blindness paradigms. Inattentional
blindness occurs when people fail to notice an otherwise sali-
ent event when their attention is occupied [9,22,23] (see
figure 1 for an example from [24]). One of the most famous
demonstrations of sustained inattentional blindness [10], in
which a man in a gorilla suit goes unnoticed by observers
performing an attentionally demanding task, is one of the
most widely recognized demonstrations in psychology, pre-
sumably because it violates people’s intuitions of what they
should be able to notice given the apparent richness of
phenomenal consciousness.
Compared to change blindness paradigms, the unex-
pected events in sustained inattentional blindness
paradigms are usually very salient, such as a novel item
appearing on screen that is a new colour or shape [23]. The
events are readily visible when a participants’ attention is
directed toward these events, but—allegedly—become invis-
ible when attention is directed toward another task, such as
counting how many times a distractor shape bounced off
the edge of the display. Because the unexpected events stay
in view for several seconds, there is not an obvious need to
compare the event to a pre-event representation (such as in
the case of change blindness paradigms), so it seems unlikely
that inattentional blindness would be due to a failure of com-
parison. However, because participants are only asked about
their experience of the unexpected event after the fact, it has
been a long-standing possibility that inattentional blindness
could be due to a limitation of memory rather than a failure
of visual awareness. Until recently, this seemed like an insur-
mountable problem with using inattentional blindness to
challenge rich phenomenology.3. The problem of failures of memory
If inattentional blindness can be explained as a failure of
memory, then demonstrations of it, like demonstrations of
change blindness, do not pose a challenge to the view that
we have rich visual awareness. Therefore, it is important to
be clear about what it means for something to be a failure
of memory and about what approaches can be taken to rule
out this possibility. A failure of memory in this case is not
the same as forgetting where you parked your car or put
your keys; it is subtler than that. Memory failures of this
type are best illustrated by two well-known paradigms in
cognitive science: the partial report paradigm used in studies
of iconic memory [25] and the rapid serial visual presentation
(RSVP) paradigm [26,27].
Partial report was originally used to demonstrate iconic
memory [25]. In these studies, participants viewed grids of
9 or 12 letters that were presented for 50 ms (see figure 1
for a schematic). First, participants were instructed to report
all the letters that had been presented. In this whole report con-
dition, participants were only able to report about four
letters. Next, participants were instructed to report only theletters that had been presented in one of the rows. In this par-
tial report condition, they were able to report about 75% of the
letters from a row of three or four letters. This indicated that
the letters available to them from the whole grid was about
nine (75%  12 letters), since they could report 75% of any
row. Critically, participants maintained this level of perform-
ance even when the row was cued after the entire display had
disappeared. So although participants did not know before-
hand which row they would be asked to report, they
nonetheless were able to report any subset of the letters that
were post-cued. This result was taken to show the existence
of a high-capacity, but fragile iconic memory store in which
all the letters of the display are encoded, but that fades
rapidly and cannot be fully accessed or reported.
These findings provided strong empirical inspiration for
distinguishing between phenomenal versus access conscious-
ness. Although participants were unable to report much of
what they saw when their reports were unconstrained (i.e.
whole report), the data appear to show that they had a
richer, more detailed representation of the display—if only
briefly. But this rich, detailed representation was not encoded
durably into memory. These experiments [25] also provided
subjective inspiration for distinguishing between phenom-
enal versus access consciousness: in the original paper by
Sperling [25], it is reported that participants felt that ‘they
have seen more than they can remember [or] report after-
wards’. (p. 1). This statement is important because it
initially established the phenomenology of iconic memory
(one could imagine a case where the same results were
obtained but where participants were not so sure about
what they saw). However, there is perhaps too much empha-
sis on this one statement, because beyond it, Sperling [25] did
not directly assess participants’ phenomenology. In addition,
it is not clear whether the statement reflects participants’
initial impression of the display, or their impression after
their substantial experience with the display (five partici-
pants took part in seven experiments spread across 12
sessions that were scheduled three times weekly). More
recent research using a modified iconic memory paradigm
has shown that feeling that you saw more than you can
report does not guarantee that the in-the-moment phenomen-
ology was of high fidelity: for example, people mistakenly
perceive letter-like symbols as real letters when presented
alongside normal letters [28].
Nonetheless, Sperling [25] demonstrates that an inability
to report one’s experience due to fragile memory encoding
does not mean the experience was sparse. This can be demon-
strated in another way by viewing an RSVP stream. In an
RSVP paradigm, visual items are presented rapidly (usually
approx. 100 ms) to the observer, one right after another (see
figure 1 for a schematic). As a result, if you were to view
an RSVP stream of letters, it is unlikely you would be able
to report all the letters you saw in order, and perhaps you
would not even be able to report any specific letter you
saw in the stream. But, in the moment, your impression of
the letters would be that they seemed clearly visible—
though fleeting—and that you were unable to report the
letters only because you were asked after the stream had
been presented.
In both the iconic memory and RSVP paradigms, partici-
pants’ experience is queried after the display has disappeared
and they cannot accurately report what they saw. This pattern
of results is also what is obtained with the inattentional
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blindness, participants are asked about their experience after
the unexpected event had come and gone. This leaves open
the possibility that participants saw the unexpected event,
but failed to encode it durably into memory, in much the
same way as in iconic memory and RSVP paradigms. ypublishing.org
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Determining whether participants saw and forgot a visual
display or failed to see the display in the first place can be diffi-
cult. In the case of iconic memory and RSVP, special report
instructions are given to the participants to allow them to
access (at least part of) their experience. The most straightfor-
ward way to distinguish between a failure to encode into
memory and a failure of perception is to have participants
immediately report what they see, when they see it.
For example, if a participant in an RSVP experiment is
told to ‘press the space bar as soon as you see the letter M’,
they will press the space bar if they see the M and fail to
press the space bar if they do not see the M. This immediate
report instruction thus provides an accurate report about in-
the-moment experience. Participants can accurately detect
targets even at exceedingly brief presentations (possibly as
fast as 13 ms, e.g. [29] but certainly as fast as 53 ms, e.g.
[30]). The task does not rely on memory because a response
is given based on what the participant does or does not per-
ceive when the target is present. Therefore, immediate report
instructions can identify failures of perception separate from
failures of memory.
However, using an immediate report task inan inattentional
blindness experiment presents a problem: if participants are
instructed to immediately report when they see something
unexpected, they then have an expectation for the unexpected
event! So while they can give an accurate report of what they
saw or failed to see, their attention to the unexpected event
will attenuate or eliminate inattentional blindness.
Because of this dilemma,determiningwhether inattentional
blindness was truly a perceptual deficit or simply just a failure
to encode into memory had been thought to be unsolvable
inprinciple, e.g. that ‘there are serious problemswith anyexper-
imental effort todirectly ask subjects if something is consciously
perceivedwithout attention’, and that this ‘proves to be imposs-
ible because the demand to report on [an unexpected event]
directs attention to [it]’ [31, p. 73].Although there has been scep-
ticism of the inattentional amnesia account of inattentional
blindness [32], it nonetheless remained a possibility, and thus
did not constitute convincing evidence against rich visual
awareness for the reasons described previously.5. Repeated inattentional blindness
Using a new technique, my colleagues and I have found a way
to escape this dilemmaandhave shown that inattentional blind-
ness truly is a deficit of perception [24]. The usual account of
inattentional blindness is that it is due to a lack of any expec-
tations about the unexpected events. But what if instead of
having no expectations, participants formed a specific expec-
tation about what type of unexpected event was to occur?
If this were the case, participants could be given the instruction
to immediately report seeing anything unexpected, but if the
unexpected event did not match their specific expectation, theywould still experience inattentional blindness paradigm (if it
were in fact a perceptual deficit).
Using a sustained inattentional blindness (e.g. [23,33]), we
showed participants a display containing the letters L and T
which could be either black or white and which moved ran-
domly across the screen. Participants counted how many
times the white Ls crossed the midline of the display. There
were four trials of this sort, but on the fifth trial, an unexpected
object—adark red cross—slowly traversed themidline (bottom
row, figure 1). Immediately after this trial, participants were
asked if they noticed anything about the last trial, and then
asked whether they noticed that a dark red cross had appeared
on screen. We found that a substantial portion of the
participants did not report seeing the unexpected event,
demonstrating the basic inattentional blindness effect.
Instead of ending the experiment there, we then gave par-
ticipants one more instruction: to keep an eye out for
anything else unexpected and to press the spacebar as soon
as they see something unexpected. As described previously,
this immediate report instruction would permit the partici-
pants to accurately report their in-the-moment experience
without relying on their memory for the experience at all.
The participants then completed several more trials: several
trials in which nothing unexpected happened, but also sev-
eral trials in which the same unexpected event (red cross)
appeared. By repeating the unexpected event in this
manner, we built up participants’ expectation about what
type of event could appear. On the final critical trial, a
novel unexpected event (blue letter E moving in the opposite
direction) appeared for half of the participants, while yet
another occurrence of the same unexpected event as before
(i.e. red cross) appeared for the other half of participants.
We found that more participants missed the novel unex-
pected event compared to the repeated unexpected event.
This demonstrated repeated inattentional blindness in the
same participants in the same session. But critically, even
when participants were willing and able to provide immedi-
ate report of the earlier unexpected events, they still missed
the novel unexpected event. Their failure to give immediate
report in this experiment thus indicates that they truly did
not consciously perceive the event, rather than failing to
encode it into memory. With these results, we concluded
that inattentional blindness genuinely reflects a deficit in per-
ception rather than memory, presenting a strong challenge to
the thesis of rich visual awareness.6. Downgrading phenomenology
To maintain that participants in inattentional blindness
experiments have any in-the-moment experience of the unex-
pected event, proponents of rich awareness must concede
that this representation cannot be used. For example, partici-
pants cannot use it to provide immediate report of any of the
specifics of the unexpected event (such as colour or shape);
cannot use it to pick out the encountered item from a line-
up (indicating that the unexpected event does not even
serve as a perceptual prime); and they cannot provide
immediate report about anything at all, even as the experience
occurs in front of their eyes for several seconds.
Given these results, what then is their conscious experience
of the unexpected event? Even if participants were able to indi-
cate that ‘something was different’ about trials in which the
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feel thisway), there is nothing functional andnothing rich about
that phenomenology. To accommodate our results showing
inattentional blindness is a perceptual deficit, the ‘richness’ of
phenomenologymust be severely downgraded. If phenomenal
consciousness is ‘what it’s like to be in [a] state’ [2] (p. 227), it
does not seem like it is like anything to participants when
they encounter an unexpected event when their attention is
otherwise engaged.
Another example of how phenomenology must be
downgraded to accommodate new empirical evidence can
be demonstrated by showing that people miss a large mag-
nitude of details or changes to scenes. As discussed
previously, there are several limitations to change blindness
that make it problematic as evidence against rich awareness.
However, it should not be dismissed entirely, especially in
cases where the number or magnitude of changes is sub-
stantial. In another recent study, my colleagues and I
combined change blindness and iconic memory to test
whether individuals required conscious perception of all
parts of a complex visual display in order to report a sum-
mary statistic about the display [16]. Our study was based
on one by Bronfman and colleagues [4], which probed the
content of in-the-moment experience by testing whether
people could report the colour diversity of an array of
coloured letters, even if their experience of the individual
letters fades too quickly to access. Other examples of sum-
mary statistics in perception, such as statistics like size
[34,35] and location [36], can be reported without any
awareness of the individual elements that make up the stat-
istic [37,38]. Likewise, we hypothesized that people would
be able to report the colour diversity of the display, but
their ability to do so would not require awareness of any
of the individual letters’ colours.
Using a modified iconic memory paradigm, participants
in this experiment were presented with a brief array of
coloured letters (see figure 1 for a schematic). The colours
could either be drawn from a narrow part of a colour
wheel (low diversity: e.g. purples and pinks) or from the
whole colour wheel (high diversity). Participants were cued
to a specific row of letters and had to report the identity of
one of the letters after the display had disappeared. Thus, par-
ticipants attended to a specific row, but did not know
beforehand which letter they would have to report (similar
to [25]). Participants also had a secondary task of reporting
the colour diversity of either the attended row or nonat-
tended rows. Replicating Bronfman et al. [4], we found that
participants could report the identity of the target letter,
and could report the colour diversity of both the attended
row and the nonattended rows.
Are people able to report colour diversity because they
are consciously encoding each of the letters’ colours, even
when the letters were unattended? Or are people able to do
this because they perceive just the diversity summary statistic
and not the individual elements?
Other studies have demonstrated that participants mista-
kenly perceive letter-like symbols as real letters when
presented alongside normal letters [28], suggesting that
people are not consciously encoding each element with
high detail. In our study, we theorized that if participants
were aware of every element in the display, they should
notice when at least one of the elements changes during the
course of the experiment. To test this, we incorporated achange blindness component to the task [4]: during half of
the trials, all of the letters’ colours in the unattended rows
were shuffled mid-trial (18 colour changes). Across two
experiments, none of the 12 participants in each noticed
any colour change during 192 change trials. This totalled
3456 missed changes. Had any participant noticed any one
of these changes, our experiment could have been used to
support rich awareness. But with these results, we concluded
that people can be aware of and report ensemble properties,
like colour diversity, without being aware of individual
elements.
To be clear, this experiment cannot rule out rich phenomen-
ology in an absolute sense. It could be the case that participants
saw all the colours in rich detail, but failed to encode the items
into memory to compare them to their initial colour before the
change. But the failure to report any of the 3456 changes high-
lights how functionless and impoverished in-the-moment
phenomenology must be. In this experiment, proponents of
rich awareness must concede that if people do experience the
colour change, the representation of this experience is not
being used in any way: the changes do not influence colour
diversity or letter recall performance; participants cannot
report any specific colour change; and they cannot report
that any change happened at all, despite participating in the
experiment for nearly an hour.7. Conclusion
Overall, to accommodate and explain repeated inattentional
blindness and massive change blindness, any theory of
phenomenal consciousness must downgrade phenomenol-
ogy to a degree where it is functionless or, ironically, does
not reflect what we experience.
If it is necessary to explain these failures by appealing to
failures of comparison or memory, then proponents of rich
awareness may find themselves in an uncomfortable pos-
ition when these failures occur in real life. Based on the
results discussed above, a driver may hit a child who has
run into the street because the driver’s attention was other-
wise occupied and he failed to perceive the child. The
alternative is that the driver saw the child in rich detail,
but failed to compare his representation of the child to a pre-
vious version, or failed to encode the child properly into
memory, and hit her with his car anyway. If this alternative
is true, then phenomenology does not seem like one worth
advocating for.
Phenomenology should be functionally useful, even if
what we are consciously aware of is sparse. Fortunately,
there are new aspects of perception that we are learning
more about as a consequence of this debate. In particular,
we are learning that our perceptual system is capable of
very sophisticated statistical perception, especially in the
absence of awareness [16,39]. Statistical perception may
help reconcile cognitive and physiological limitations with
our subjective impression of a rich detailed world [39]. For
example, we are only seeing rich detail and colour in central
vision to begin with, and our perception of scenes arises
through stitched-together fixations [40]. By better under-
standing the representations that result from statistical
perception, we may better understand why we have a holistic
experience of our visual environment. There is also much we
do not understand about how cues affect visual awareness,
rstb.royalsocietypubl
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may bring it into awareness for the first time [41]. Exploring
visual awareness through these avenues may help us under-
stand why we feel like we experience a rich visual world
when we in fact do not.
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